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Archive for the ‘Money’ Category

In a recent forum held by the ECB (ECB Forum on Central Banking 2021: Part 4 – Panel 1: The future of inflation, see min. 15:40 – 26:20), Professor Charles Goodhart criticised central banks for relying too much on what he called the ‘bootstrap theory of inflation’, one that affirms that ‘as long as inflation expectations are anchored inflation will also remain anchored’. Therefore, this theory mainly explains inflation according to changes in inflation expectations. Charles Goodhart also summarised the reasons why we shouldn’t rely too much on such a theory of inflation. In what he referred to as the absence of a general theory of inflation by central banks and other policy actors and international organisations, there seems to be a preference for a ‘bits and pieces’ approach to inflation; one that incorporates inflation of commodities, inflation in services, shipping shortages, … among many other indicators, without the proper analytical theoretical framework to support it. In his brief presentation Charles Goodhart stressed the need to incorporate supply side factors in the explanation of inflation trends in the long term. Do not miss it. In just 10 minutes he summarises the poor state of macroeconomics as regards the explanation of inflation, which can lead to also very poor policy decisions.

In my opinion, there is such a general theory of inflation/deflation; one that links changes in the amount of money broadly defined and changes in the price level over the medium to the long term. I don’t claim that this theory can explain every single change in inflation, particularly on a monthly basis, but indeed it does explain changes in inflation trends. The ECB should rely much more on its own monetary pillar to explain changes in inflation in the right time horizon (1-2 years). It missed an excellent opportunity to do so in its recent review of its monetary strategy.

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Dear readers and blog followers,

Please, find below a unique Christmas card with a very relevant message, as sent by the Institute of International Monetary Research earlier this week. The card has a text from the Spanish scholastic, Martín de Azpilicueta (School of Salamanca), who alerted to the effects of the over-issue of the currency and the subsequent danger of inflation back in the XVI c. in Spain. I wish current regulators and monetary-policy makers read him much more often.

Merry Christmas to you all.

—————————————-

Estimado lector y seguidor de este foro,

Es un placer poder despedir este año con una felicitación Navideña como ésta, tan única y apropiada para estos tiempos que corren, enviada por el Institute of International Monetary Research esta semana. Contiene una cita del gran escolástico Navarro, Martín de Azpilicueta (Escuela de Salamanca), quien ya alertara de los peligros de la sobre-emisión de moneda y de la inflación subsiguiente a mediados de la España del siglo XVI. Ojalá le leyeran más los reguladores y hacedores de la política monetaria en la actualidad.

Muy Feliz Navidad a todos.

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Central banks are not just interest rate setters: an introduction to modern central bank roles

This is the online presentation I made at the 2020 Freedom Week (by the Adam Smith Institute and the Institute of Economic Affairs) on August 21st. It is an overview of the major roles undertaken by modern central banks in our economies, which involves much more than setting the policy rate. Actually, since the outbreak of the Global Financial Crisis what leading central banks have been doing is to act as ‘bank of banks’, ‘bank of the government’ and, as regards monetary policy, to engage in asset purchase operations (i.e. Quantitative Easing). Once policy rates were brought down to the effective lower (nominal) bound, central banks have used outright asset purchases to be able to affect macroeconomic outcomes. Contrary to a very popular misperception, in purely fiat monetary systems, central banks cannot run out of ammunition, even when nominal policy rates are zero or close to zero. In this presentation, I briefly discuss (1) what central banks do as providers of services to the banking sector and to the government, as well as (2) the importance of monetary analysis to understand the effects of changes in the amount of money on inflation and output over the medium to the long term. This is at the core of what we do at the Institute of International Monetary Research.

I hope you find it a good introduction to central bank roles in modern economies. As ever, comments welcome.

Juan Castaneda

PS. If only for enjoying James Gillray‘s caricatures as a means to explain money and central banking, it may well be worth watching.

 

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On the economic effects of the policy responses to Covid-19

Today the Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA, London) has just published a report by my colleague Tim Congdon and myself (Institute of International Monetary Research and University of Buckingham) on the debate on the expected inflationary vs. deflationary consequences of the current crisis. Of course there are many unknowns yet and we should not claim or have the illusion that we can forecast exactly inflation rates in the next 2-3 years. But what we can attempt is to do ‘pattern predictions’ (see Hayek’s 1974 Nobel lecture speech). Based on the monetary data available and the theoretical body linking changes in the amount of money to price changes over the medium/long term, we have observed in the last two months an extraordinary increase in the amount of money in most leading economies (certainly in the USA, with a rate of growth of money, M3, of 25% in April 2020). This comes from the implementation of quite significant asset purchases programmes (i.e. Quantitative Easing) and the (partial) monetisation of very much enlarged government deficits; a trend that will most likely continue for the rest of the year. It is both the extraordinary money growth rates seen recently, along with the expected persistence in monetary growth in 2020 what support our forecast of an inflationary cycle in the US (and in other leading economies, though to a lesser extent) in the next 2-3 years. The diagram below from the report says it all (see page 8).
More details in the report (IEA Covid-19 Briefing 7, June 2020) at:
https://iea.org.uk/themencode-pdf-viewer-sc/?file=/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/Inflation_the-new-threat25787FINAL.pdf. Also, the webinar presentation of the report with my colleagues Geoffrey Wood and Tim Congdon will be available soon at the IEA’s website/YouTube channel.
Money growth (M£) in the USA
Juan Castañeda
Summary of the report (in pages 4-5):
  • The policy reaction to the Covid-19 pandemic will increase budget deficits massively in all the world’s leading countries. The deficits will to a significant extent be monetised, with heavy state borrowing from both national central banks and commercial banks.
  • The monetisation of budget deficits, combined with official support for emergency bank lending to cash-strained corporates, is leading – and will continue to lead for several months – to extremely high growth rates of the quantity of money.
  • The crisis has shown again that, under fiat monetary systems, the state can create as much as money as it wants. There is virtually no limit to money creation. The frequently alleged claim that ‘monetary policy is exhausted at low (if not zero) interest rates’ has no theoretical or empirical basis.
  • By mid- or late 2021 the pandemic should be under control, and a big bounce-back in financial markets, and in aggregate demand and output, is to be envisaged. The extremely high growth rates of money now being seen – often into the double digits at an annual percentage rate – will instigate an inflationary boom. The scale of the boom will be conditioned by the speed of money growth in the rest of 2020 and in early 2021. Money growth in the USA has reached the highest-ever levels in peacetime, suggesting that consumer inflation may move into double digits at some point in the next two or three years.
  • Central banks seem heedless of the inflation risks inherent in monetary financing of the much-enlarged government deficits. Following the so-called ‘New Keynesian Model’ consensus, their economists ignore changes in the quantity of money. Too many of these economists believe that monetary policy is defined exclusively by interest rates, with a narrow focus on the central bank policy rate, long-term interest rates and the yield curve. The quantity theory of money today provides – as it always has done – a theoretical framework which relates trends in money growth to changes in inflation and nominal GDP over the medium and long term. A condition for the return of inflation to current target levels is that the rate of money growth is reduced back towards annual rates of increase of about 6 per cent or less.

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A model of parallel currencies under free exchange rates

Money is one of the most studied and truly complex phenomena in Economics. How money is created? And how is it destroyed? ‘What constitutes money and what doesn’t? Is money only the means of payment sanctioned by law, by the State? In our current monetary systems, can we ‘create’ as much as money as we like? If so, wouldn’t it be inflationary? These are some of the questions Economics students frequently ask at the start their degrees. Today I am only going to focus, if only timidly, on one of them; the absence of competition in the national currencies markets in our days. Of course, the absence of competition in this market is not the result of the application of the conventional laws of Economics; quite the opposite, as masterly explained by Vera Smith in her ‘Rationale of Central Banking and the Free Banking Alternative’ in 1936, the granting of the legal tender clause to a single currency, that issued by the State, has been an explicit decision made by the government (the relation between the State and the central bank has always been problematic to say the least, you can find more details on it here). F. Hayek also explains marvellously the abolishment of the laws of Economics as regards money in his ‘Denationalisation of Money’ in 1976. More recently, my colleague from the Institute of International Monetary Research (IIMR), Tim Congdon, discussed this issue in his ‘Money in a Free Society’ in 2009 and makes the case for a privatised and truly independent central bank, detached from the political agenda or the economic needs of the government.

Following this debate, two colleagues of mine, Pedro Schwartz and Sebastian Damrich, and myself have reflected on these issues in a working paper just published by the Applied Economics Centre of the John Hopkins University (‘A model of parallel currencies under free floating exchange rates’. In Studies in Applied Economics, Num. 160, June 2020). In the paper we assess the feasibility of a parallel currency system under different macroeconomic scenarios. We first offer the rationale for the introduction of more competition in this market and then develop a model to see wether (and under which conditions) a parallel currency system ends up in the running of a single currency economy, or rather in two currencies competing for the market. We draw policy implications and use the the eurozone as a case-study, but the model could well be applied to any other set of countries sharing a currency or willing to access a different currency area. In a nutshell, what we show in the model is the conditions for the issuer of each currency to gain a higher market share and benefit from it. We make a distinction between (1) a macroeconomic stable scenario, defined in the paper ‘as one in which the sensitivity of the market share of the currencies to changes in prices in both currencies is not high (as we presume changes in inflation in both currencies will be rather small)’ (see page 25). In this scenario, it is ultimately the supply of each currency what determines their market share (the less inflationary currency will gain more market share over time); and (2) a highly unstable macroeconomic scenario, ‘where agents’ demand of each currency is very sensitive to changes in relative prices in both currencies. In this high price sensitive scenario, an increase in the switching costs to favour the use of one of the currencies (i.e. the government’s preferred currency) would only lead to inflation in that favoured currency and very quickly to its expulsion from the market’ (see page 25). The model can thus be applied to well-established economies, where both the national currency and the common currency circulate in the economy and to highly inflationary economies, where the government favours the use of its currency and uses the currency as a source of revenues (i.e. seigniorage).

This is the abstract of the paper, which you will be able to access in full here:

‘The production of good money seems to be out of reach for most countries. The aim of this paper is to examine how a country can attain monetary stability by granting legal tender to two freely tradable currencies circulating in parallel. Then we examine how such a system of parallel currencies could be used for any Member State of the Eurozone, with both the euro and a national currency accepted as legal tender, which we argue is a desirable monetary arrangement particularly but not only in times of crisis. The necessary condition for this parallel system to function properly is confidence in the good behaviour of the monetary authorities in charge of each currency. A fully floating exchange rate between the two would keep the issuers of the new local currency in check. This bottom-up solution based on currency choice could also be applied
in countries aspiring to enter the Eurozone, instead of the top-down once and for all imposition of the euro as a single currency that has turned out to be very stringent and has shown institutional flaws during the recent Eurozone crisis of 2009 – 2013. Our scheme would have alleviated the plight of Greece and Cyprus. It could also ease the entry of the eight Member States still missing from the Eurozone.’

All comments welcome. We still have to work more on the paper and suggestions for change and further references will be most appreciated.

 

Juan E. Castañeda

PS. A previous study on parallel currencies by P. Schwartz, F. Cabrillo and myself can be found here; where we put it forward as a solution to ease and expedite the adjustments needed to apply to the Greek economy in the midst of the so-called euro crisis.

 

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It’s not all about interest rates!

In a piece published by CityAM on 12/11/2019 (‘Interest rates aren’t central banks’ only ammunition to defend against recession‘), I criticised the view apparently shared by most policy commentators about the alleged lack of ammunition of central banks to tackle the next crisis; they claim that this is because policy rates have reached either zero or close to zero levels and therefore there is no more room for monetary expansion. As I put in the article, this is wrong:

But interest rate change is not the only policy tool available to create money. Indeed, nor is it the most effective in times of crisis. In modern economies, where monetary systems are purely based on fiat currencies, money can be created “out of thin air”. As shocking as it may sound, this means that central banks can always increase the amount of money in the economy.

Since 2008 central bank (main policy) rates had been cut down to zero or near zero territory, and for many years it was mainly by changes in the amount of money how central banks managed to stabilise spending (through unconventional policy measures or QE). The outcome in the US, the UK but also in the Eurozone (though achieved much later), has been the stabilisation of the rate of growth of broad money in these economies followed by a period of a relatively stable overall macroeconomic picture (i.e. broad money growth in the US around 4% – 5% for a long period of time).

 

Broad money growth, US

 

The fundamentals to understand how monetary policy decisions are made in modern monetary systems, particularly in times of a financial crisis, where commercial banks struggle to expand deposits, can be summarised as follows:

  • In the absence of a truly binding anchor (such a metallic standard under the gold or silver standards) central banks can always create money ‘out of thin air’, with no limit.
  • In modern monetary systems both commercial banks and central banks create money; actually the bulk of the means of payments used are created by commercial banks in the form of deposits and the extension of overdrafts (see the seminal paper on this, Money creation in the modern economy , by McLead, Radia and Thomas, 2014).
  • The announcement and later application of tighter bank regulation in the midst of the Global Financial Crisis (2009 – 2010) increased bank capital requirements by approx. 60%, thus limiting the ability of banks to give loans and create deposits (i.e. money) in an already recessive economy. In the absence of the creation of money by markets (i.e. banks), central banks had no choice but to step in and buy assets from the market (from non-financial institutions), the so-called QE operations. Otherwise, money supply would have contracted very severely, with the harm it would have inflicted on the economy (this time, central bankers were determined to avoid the mistakes they made in the Great Depression years as Ben Bernanke had famously put it back in 2002, when deposits contracted by more than 30% in four years in the USA, therefore aggravating and prolonging the recession).

I argue in the article that, for better or worse, the ‘monetary weaponry’ in modern monetary systems can never be exhausted (Venezuela today is a dramatic example of it, when the printing press is heavily exploited by the government). Under purely fiat monetary systems, we need to tie the hands of the central banks so they abide by a rule in order to maintain a moderate and stable rate of growth of money; a rule that does not result in excessive money growth during the expansion of the economy, nor in a strong decline or even a fall in money growth during recessions. My colleague from the University of Buckingham and the Institute of International Monetary Research, Professor Geoffrey Wood, explains masterly and in few minutes how to define and adopt such a monetary rule in the Eurozone in this video.

 

Juan Castañeda

PS. You can have access to the CityAM article in full at https://www.cityam.com/interest-rates-arent-central-banks-only-ammunition-to-defend-against-recession/

 

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A proposal for Target2 reform and a capped mutualisation debt scheme in Europe

‘Under a monetary union, fiscal and monetary discipline have to go hand in hand if macroeconomic stability is to be maintained. The question is how to set up the right institutions to achieve this stability in a credible manner. This policy brief proposes a new institutional arrangement for the euro area to restore fiscal discipline. It places the responsibility for compliance entirely on the shoulders of the member states. It also provides for the mutualisation of 30% of the member states’ debt-to-GDP ratio.
This would help to maintain a stable currency and to limit the risk of contagion should another crisis occur in the future. However, this comes at a cost. Under the fiscal scheme proposed, member states, which would be fully fiscally sovereign, would need to run long-term sound fiscal policies to benefit from euro membership. In addition, this brief proposes a reform of Target2 under which overspending economies would have to pay the financial cost of accessing extra euros, which would deter the accumulation of internal imbalances within the euro area. All this is expected to change the current fragility of the architecture of the euro, provide member states with the right incentives to abide by sounder economic principles and make them fully responsible for the policies they adopt.’

The above is the abstract of a research report I have just written on the reforms needed to undertake to re-balance the eurozone economy, published by the Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies. As you will read in the report, I don’t favour more centralisation of fiscal competences to the ‘federal’ level (be it Brussels or Frankfurt), but instead to abide by the subsidiarity principle as much as possible; and thus to make Member States (MSs) fully responsible for their own macroeconomic policies and public finances. The euro is a sort of a ‘monetary club’ (some will claim, and quite rightly, that it is much more than that) with benefits and costs of membership. As to the benefits, these are particularly evident for those economies with a poor inflation record in the running of their own national currencies in the past; for which the euro has provided a strong monetary anchor and therefore greater  price stability and lower borrowing costs. As to the costs, these were more subtle before the Eurozone crisis (and indeed less publicised at the time of the launch of the euro), and have become much more evident since then: simply put, MSs do not have access to their own (national) monetary policy anymore in order to ‘alleviate’ the costs of adjustment to a crisis, and also have limited sovereignty over their fiscal policy.

The reforms introduced during and after the recent crisis have confirmed the direction of change in the eurozone towards ever more co-ordination of macro policies; and therefore more and more conditions and criteria are now in place to closely monitor and eventually fine MSs for the running of (severe) fiscal and also macroeconomic imbalances (see the the new ‘Fiscal Compact’ and the new ‘Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure’ for more details). If anything, the experience of how the excessive public deficits and public debt by different MSs were handled by the eurozone institutions before the crisis is not very promising; even less so now that the complexity and degree of macroeconomic integration and regulation are even greater. The approach I adopt in this report is quite different.

In a nutshell:

(1) I put forward a (capped) debt mutualisation scheme, so those MSs running sound fiscal policies and sustainable budgets can benefit from it; and those in excess of the annual debt threshold will have to issue their own bonds, backed only by their own national revenues and credibility. The scheme, once launched, is communicated to the MS and it is not negotiable; the scheme also decreases in the coverage of the MSs public debt for the current levels down to a 30% ratio of the GDP in ten years. With this scheme, the MSs will have the incentives to meet the pre-announced annual targets, as their debt will be covered under the debt mutualisation programme, and thus will benefit from much lower borrowing costs. And, crucially, there is no need to monitor nor regulate further the fiscal or macroeconomic performance of the MSs.

(2) I also propose a major reform of Target2, which has accumulated (particularly since 2008) enormous imbalances among MSs (see the latest balances across MSs at the ECB website here): On the one hand, Italy holds a debit position amounting to approx. 30% of its GDP while Spain’s is 25% of its GDP; on the other hand, Germany holds a credit position close for the value of nearly 30% of its GDP. The reform proposed in the report would consist of setting a price for access to credit (if only the ECB policy rate), so overspending economies find it more and more costly to keep on borrowing and thus accumulate further imbalances. A way to settle the existing balances cross MSs must be also addressed.

(3) There are other key elements in the report for the proposals above to be effective, such as the return to the ‘no bailout clause’ of MSs, and the possibility of an errant economy to leave the eurozone (or be temporarily suspended). More details in the report.

 

Juan Castañeda

Full text of the report at: https://www.martenscentre.eu/publications/rebalancing-euro-area-proposal-future-reform

Feedback most welcome.

 

 

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‘Money talks’ is a series of mini-videos the Institute of International Monetary Research (IIMR) will start to release every week on the 18th of June, Monday.

The name of the series says it all: experts in money and central banking will be covering key concepts to understand better monetary economics in less than two minutes long videos. Tim Congdon (Chairman of the IIMR) and Geoffrey Wood (IIMR Academic Advisory Council) along with myself and many others to come will be addressing the fundamentals in money and banking to be able to understand how our monetary systems work and which are the roles and functions of modern central banks.

The topics address include the following:

Episode 1: What is Money?

Episode 2: What is the Central Bank?

Episode 3: What is the Monetary Base?

Episode 4: What is the Money Multiplier?

Episode 5: What does Monetary Policy consist of?

Episode 6: What is Central Bank Independence?

Episode 7: The Central Bank as the Lender of Last Resort

Episode 8: Bail outs and Bank Failures

Episode 9: Basel Rules

Episode 10: What os ‘Narrow Banking’?

Episode 11: Fiat Money

Episode 12: What is a monetary policy rule?

Episode 13: What is Monetarism?

Episode 14: Monetary Policy Tasks

But of course, these are just the ones we are starting with. The list will be expanded in the next few weeks and the aim is to produce a library of mini-videos that could be a good reference to search for short definitions on money, banking and central banking.

If you are interested in this project, please subscribe to the IIMR YouTube channel (https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLudZPVEs3S82iu2zb-QZfcK7pqnrHfPgO) to stay tuned.

As ever, comments and feedback most welcome!

 

Juan Castañeda

 

 

 

 

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Last month I had the pleasure to contribute to the IIMR/IEA annual monetary conference (8 November 2017) in London, ‘Has Financial Regulation Gone Too Far? And do banks really need all the extra capital?‘. I gave a short talk in session 3, ‘The role of the central bank in financial regulation‘, chaired by Charles Goodhart (LSE), on the essential nature of central banks as banking institutions. It may sound silly to state the obvious but, as my good friend, mentor and excellent colleague – Pedro Schwartz – always reminds me, we should not take for granted the fundamentals in economics, even less in money and central banking. Let me then start by saying that modern central banks were established to cope with two major tasks: (1) to be the bankers of the State (the Bank of England and other continental European central banks are good examples of this, see here) but also (2) to become the bankers of the banks in monetary systems operated under a fractional reserve (again, the Bank of England is the first modern central bank in this regard); the latter is what we call the lender of last resort function of central banks.

In the early years of the establishment of central banks, with the running of the gold standard, strictly speaking, there was no monetary policy nor the pursue of a macroeconomic target as we understand it now; but a bank of issue with a privilege position in the monetary market, and mainly focused on maintaining the convertibility of its currency at the pre-announced rate. It was only quite recently (historically speaking), after the abandonment of the gold standard in the interwar years, that central banks have explicitly adopted or given other tasks, and indeed macroeconomic tasks, such as keeping price stability or achieving economic growth.

But we should not forget that central banks are at the core of the monetary system and the banking sector, providing financial services to a ‘club’ of commercial banks which create money in the currency issued by the central banks. Which money? ‘Bank money’, that is, bank deposits under a fractional reserve system. This money constitutes the bulk of the money supply in modern economies, and it is vital for the central bank to keep a steady growth of the amount of money in circulation to preserve stable and long term economic growth; thus avoiding too much money during the expansion of the economy or too little in a banking crisis. What I state in my talk is that privately-owned central banks are genuinely interested in maintaining financial stability, and thus will be willing to intervene in a liquidity crisis much more promptly and efficiently than a central bank under the shadow – if not the control – of the State. This is something I have supported in other articles (recently in this article), and my colleague at the IIMR, Tim Congdon, has written on (see chapter 7 in ‘Central Banking in a Free Society‘).

This is the video of the talk:

Comments are very welcome as ever!

 

Juan Castañeda

PS. To the best of my knowledge the characterisation of central banks as the bankers of a ‘club’ was first coined by Charles Goodhart in his seminal 1988 book, ‘The Evolution of Central Banks‘, a book anyone interested in the history and functions of central banks must read. However, unlike Goodhart’s position in his book, I do not see a conflict of interest for a self-interested central bank to become a lender of last resort in times of crisis. Actually, central banks did make a profit when lending in times of crisis, such as the Bank of England in several banking crises in the 19th century.

 

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This is the title of an article written with my colleague, Tim Congdon (Institute of International Monetary Research and University of Buckingham), published in CityAM on 27/10/2017.

Our main point is that more regulation won’t make banks safer and is counterproductive. It is a sort of an instinctive reaction by politicians, policy-makers and regulators to respond to a crisis with more and tighter regulation, in an effort to tackle the ‘excesses’ in the market economy left of its own will. This is both very naive and irresponsible, as much as empirically and theoretically wrong. The recent announcement and approval of the Basell III tighter bank capital ratios is an example of it: this tougher set of regulations was announced and approved in the midst of a severe financial crisis (2008-2010), and resulted in banks shrinking their balance sheets even more; with the expected dramatic fall in money growth and nominal spending.

It is again a dire example of the running of the law of the unintended consequences of regulation; which would recommend the need to assess in advance the expected consequences of regulation, rather than quickly and desperately calling for more and tougher laws on banks and the rest of the financial system.

As we put it in the article:

Far too many people believe that “better” regulation is the answer to financial crises. But further regulation involves an expansion of the power of the state, and a loss of freedom for the financial system. Remember that Britain had no explicit official rules on bank capital until the 1980s, yet no British bank suffered a run on its deposits over the preceding century. Crucial to the success of British banking in the decades before the Northern Rock fiasco was the Bank of England’s willingness to lend to solvent banks if they were having difficulty funding their assets. Good central banking helped Britain’s commercial banks to run their businesses efficiently and profitably, and to the benefit of their customers.’

There was a time, not that far away, when regulation was not that prominent and financial markets flourished; and when a banking institution failed, that occasionally they did, there were solid policies and institutions willing to intervene in an decisively and orderly manner (the Bank of England had been an example of that, at least until the collapse of Norther rock in the recent crisis).

You will find the article in full here: http://www.cityam.com/274672/tighter-bank-regulation-wont-stop-boom-and-bust-but-damage.

Comments, even more if critical, most welcome!

Juan Castañeda

PS. We will be discussing these issues with the member of the Bank of England’ s Financial Policy Committee, Martin Taylor, in the IIMR Annual Public Lecture on the 7/10 in London: https://www.mv-pt.org/events/public-lecture-the-committee-of-public-safety-the-work-of-the-financial-policy-committee-by-m

 

 

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