Feeds:
Posts
Comments

Archive for the ‘Crisis’ Category

Video of the presentation to the Centre for Global Finance (SOAS, University of London) on 12/5/2021, via webinar.

Summary points:

  • The monetisation of enlarged budget deficits, combined with official support for emergency bank lending to cash-strained corporates, has led to extremely high growth- rates of the quantity of money (broadly defined) in leading economies, which are incompatible with price stability over the medium term. The excess in money balances by financial companies in 2020 has already led to a big bounce-back in financial markets and asset price inflation. In addition, once lockdowns are over and the pandemic is under control, the excess in money holdings by households and non-financial companies will result in higher nominal spending and output, and eventually CPI inflation.
  • In sharp contrast with the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis, the central banks’ response to Covid-19 crisis has resulted in an expansion of their balance sheets but also critically of bank deposits, and thus of the amount of money in the economy broadly defined (M3 in the USA). It is changes in the latter what explains changes in inflation over the medium term, and central banks should pay more attention in monitoring changes in broad money as effective leading indicators of inflation in 1-2 years.
  • We are already seeing a significant increase in commodity prices, industrial prices and also in CPI prices in the USA. The extremely high growth rates of money seen in the USA since March 2021 (the highest rate in modern peacetime, over 25% year on year in 2020) will end up in an inflationary boom over the next few years. The duration and scale of the boom will be conditioned by the speed of broad money growth in the rest of 2021 and in early 2022; thus, on the reaction of the US Fed to rising CPI inflation in the rest of 2021 and 2022.
  • The quantity theory of money provides a valid theoretical framework which relates trends in money growth to changes in inflation and nominal GDP over the medium and long term. More details on this analysis on the report by myself in collaboration with my colleague T. Congdon (IIMR) (https://iea.org.uk/publications/33536/), published in the spring 2020 by the IEA. More up to date data can be accessed at the IIMR website.

Video available below (on CFG’s YouTube channel) :

With thanks to the CGF for hosting the webinar.

Comments welcome.

Juan Castañeda

Read Full Post »

Este es título del libro que acabo de publicar con Unión Editorial, bajo la edición de José Antonio Aguirre, todo un referente en Economía en España en lo que se refiere a la publicación de libros sobre moneda y banca central, tanto los suyos propios como traducciones muy meritorias que incluyen excelentes estudios de los clásicos en este campo. Este libro es una traducción al castellano del original escrito por el economista monetario y colega mío en el Institute of International Monetary Research (IIMR), Tim Congdon, y yo mismo, publicado por el Institute of Economic Affairs de Londres en Junio de 2020.

Portada libro

Lo que hacemos en el libro es detallar cómo se crea el dinero (entendido en un sentido amplio, que incorpora los depósitos bancarios en su definición) en economías modernas; y cómo la financiación por parte de los bancos y del banco central del creciente gasto público en que los gobiernos han incurrido desde Marzo de 2020 tiene efectos muy significativos sobre los precios y el ciclo económico, tanto en el corto como en el medio y largo plazo. 

Si bien el análisis de los procesos por los que se crea el dinero son aplicables a cualquier economía moderna, utilizamos en nuestro estudio únicamente datos referentes a la economía de EEUU. Lo hacemos así por su relevancia en la economía mundial y porque ha sido precisamente en EEUU donde el crecimiento monetario desde Marzo de 2020 ha sido más excepcional, al menos comparado con el de otras economías avanzadas. En la segunda mitad de 2020, el crecimiento del dinero (medido a través del agregado monetario M3) ha superado tasas del 25% interanual, lo que significa una tasa récord de crecimiento del dinero en tiempos de paz en la historia reciente de EEUU.

Crecimiento Monetario en EEUU durante la Crisis Financiera International (2008-09) y la crisis de Covid-19(fuente, ‘IIMR Monthly Note, October 2020‘) 

Oferta monetario

Es importante la diferenciación que hacemos en nuestro análisis entre distintos tipos de agregados monetarios: Por un lado está la ‘base monetaria’, constituida por el efectivo creado por el banco central o la casa de moneda nacional y las reservas bancarias en el banco central. La base monetaria representa un porcentaje ciertamente pequeño de la cantidad de medios de pago que usamos en nuestras transacciones cotidianas, y menos aún si se trata de transacciones de mayor valor monetario. Este agregado monetario reducido no es más que entre un 10% – 15% de los medios de pago disponibles en la economía. El resto de la oferta monetaria está constituida por los depósitos bancarios que usamos regularmente mediante el empleo de tarjetas de pago y transacciones bancarias.

Lo distintivo del crecimiento monetario registrado desde Marzo de 2020 en EEUU, es que ha crecido la cantidad de dinero en su sentido más amplio, incluyendo depósitos bancarios; esto es, la oferta monetaria. Y es el crecimiento de este último agregado monetario el que explica de mejor manera variaciones en la inflación en bienes y servicios, así como fluctuaciones de la actividad económica a lo largo del ciclo económico (ver el análisis empírico entre variaciones de la cantidad de dinero y la inflación y la renta nominal en el estudio publicado por el IIMR aquí).

Esta vez sí es diferente

En la crisis financiera de 2008-09, lo que creció fue la base monetaria (el balance de los bancos centrales), pero no la oferta monetaria que, de hecho, cayó en 2009 y 2010 y fue acompañada de desinflación y deflación. De ahí que no hubiera inflación de bienes de consumo entonces (aunque sí la hubo de precios de activos), y nuestra previsión que explicamos en el libro es que sí la habrá en esta ocasión, tras la crisis de Covid-19. No será automática ni inmediata. De hecho, el cuándo y cuánto subirán los precios es difícil de decir con precisión, aunque sí nos atrevemos a ofrecer cifras en el libro. Lo que sí que podemos apuntar son tendencias de precios a medio y largo plazo. Una vez que lo peor de la actual crisis sanitaria haya pasado y la economía vuelva a re-abrirse, el exceso de dinero creado en los últimos meses no habrá desaparecido ‘por arte de magia’. Será entonces, muy probablemente en los años 2021-2022, cuando veremos un fuerte aumento de la demanda nominal en la economía, seguida de presiones inflacionistas, que conducirán a tasas de inflación ciertamente por encima de las tasas que hemos visto en los últimos años.

Más detalles y análisis sobre todo ello en el libro. Como siempre, comentarios y críticas muy bienvenidos.

Juan Castañeda

Read Full Post »

Moneda, precios y el monetarismo en Europa

Aquí podéis encontrar la charla que tuve el placer de dar a mis amigos y colegas del Centro Hazlitt de la Universidad Francisco Marroquín (UFM), en Guatemala (Marzo 2020). El tema era la vigencia (o su no vigencia) del monetarismo como perspectiva y escuela de análisis económico en Europa. Como comprobaréis, soy muy pesimista en mi presentación; sobre todo en lo que se refiere a la explicación de la inflación en los modelos económicos predominantes en las ultimas tres/cuatro décadas. A pesar de ello, reivindico el uso de un análisis monetario riguroso (de la oferta y de la demand da dinero) si queremos explicar tendencias en los precios en el medio y largo plazo; una afirmación que me parece obvia, pero que en el entorno académico actual resulta tristemente revolucionaria … . Además, si bien soy muy crítico con el estado de los modelos macroeconómicos en lo que respecta a la explicación de la inflación, soy más optimista por lo que en la práctica los bancos centrales hacen cuando se enfrentan a una crisis financiera. Hemos visto cómo a partir de 2009/10 (o más tarde en la Eurozona), los bancos centrales recurrieron a operaciones de compra de activos (‘expansión cuantitativa’ o QE en sus siglas en inglés) para evitar la caída de la cantidad de dinero. Querían evitar con ello caer en el mismo error en el que cayó la Reserva Federal de los EEUU en los años 30 del siglo XX. Pareciera como si, por la vía de los hechos, los bancos centrales estuvieran persiguiendo una política monetaria encaminada a lograr la estabilidad del crecimiento del dinero (‘a la Friedman’).

Asimismo, también comento en algún detalle en la presentación algunas de las críticas más habituales que se hacen al monetarismo desde distintas perspectivas teóricas: como (1) la (supuesta) necesidad de imponer la estabilidad en la demanda de dinero (o de su inversa, la velocidad de circulación) para su validez en la práctica; o (2) el no tratamiento de los efectos reales que las variaciones en la cantidad de dinero traen consigo a medio y largo plazo. Como veréis en este video, intento demostrar que ambas críticas no son ciertas o están basadas en supuestos erróneos, y que la ecuación cuantitativa del dinero sigue siendo un esquema teórico válido para explicar variaciones de los precios y de la actividad nominal a lo largo del tiempo. Eso sí, no debería utilizarse esta ecuación y los supuestos en los que se basa, de una manera miope y mecanicista; eso sería un error grave. Hay muchas variables que afectan a la inflación en el corto plazo que están fuera del alcance de esta ecuación y de lo que los banqueros centrales pueden aspirar a controlar. Además, hay un grado indudable de incertidumbre y de retardos en la transmisión de las variaciones de la cantidad de dinero en los precios y la actividad económica; de ahí que sea mejor hacer análisis en el medio y largo plazo o en tendencia.

Aquí tenéis la grabación de la charla, que fue seguida de un coloquio con los miembros del Centro Hazlitt de la UFM que resultó muy provechoso e interesante. Muchas gracias a los asistentes y especialmente a Daniel Fernandez y a Clynton López, por su amable invitación a participar en estos seminarios. A ver cuándo podemos repetirlo!

Juan Castañeda

 

Read Full Post »

‘Devaluaciones competitivas y crecimiento económico’: Presentación en la Universidad Francisco Marroquín (UFM), Guatemala, en Marzo de 2020.

Podéis encontrar el video de la charla aquí:

De lo que hablo en esta charla es de (1) las consecuencias reales de las devaluaciones competitivas a medio y largo plazo y (2) de las diferencias entre una devaluación interna y externa. Utilizo ejemplos de las devaluaciones competitivas de la Peseta de los años 90 del siglo XX en España y de las llamadas ‘políticas de austeridad’ o de ‘devaluación interna’ practicadas durante la crisis de la Eurozona (approx. 2009 – 2013). Las primeras no condujeron a una mejora real de la competitividad de la economía española a medio y largo plazo, mientras que las segundas sí supusieron una bajada de costes y precios y, en última instancia, una mejora en la balanza por cuenta corriente española. También recurro al ejemplo de la economía británica bajo el patrón oro, cuando no eran posibles devaluaciones competitivas y la moneda mantuvo su poder de compra estable durante aproximadamente un siglo; lo que fue acompañado de un crecimiento significativo de la economía. Y, sí, como cada vez que puedo, utilizo las caricaturas clásicas de James Gillray para explicar el patrón oro. Además, (3) dedico los últimos minutos de la presentación a una reflexión sobre lo que la Economía enseña y cómo creo debería enseñarse, algunas de sus leyes fundamentales, así como a la actitud intelectual modesta y precavida que el economista debe adoptar a la hora de diseñar políticas.

Espero que disfruten de la presentación y la encuentren provechosa. Tengan en cuenta que está dirigida a alumnos cursando de estudios de Economía en educación secundaria. Como siempre, fue un placer visitar la UFM y colaborar con buenos amigos y colegas.

Juan E. Castañeda

 

 

Read Full Post »

On the economic effects of the policy responses to Covid-19

Today the Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA, London) has just published a report by my colleague Tim Congdon and myself (Institute of International Monetary Research and University of Buckingham) on the debate on the expected inflationary vs. deflationary consequences of the current crisis. Of course there are many unknowns yet and we should not claim or have the illusion that we can forecast exactly inflation rates in the next 2-3 years. But what we can attempt is to do ‘pattern predictions’ (see Hayek’s 1974 Nobel lecture speech). Based on the monetary data available and the theoretical body linking changes in the amount of money to price changes over the medium/long term, we have observed in the last two months an extraordinary increase in the amount of money in most leading economies (certainly in the USA, with a rate of growth of money, M3, of 25% in April 2020). This comes from the implementation of quite significant asset purchases programmes (i.e. Quantitative Easing) and the (partial) monetisation of very much enlarged government deficits; a trend that will most likely continue for the rest of the year. It is both the extraordinary money growth rates seen recently, along with the expected persistence in monetary growth in 2020 what support our forecast of an inflationary cycle in the US (and in other leading economies, though to a lesser extent) in the next 2-3 years. The diagram below from the report says it all (see page 8).
More details in the report (IEA Covid-19 Briefing 7, June 2020) at:
https://iea.org.uk/themencode-pdf-viewer-sc/?file=/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/Inflation_the-new-threat25787FINAL.pdf. Also, the webinar presentation of the report with my colleagues Geoffrey Wood and Tim Congdon will be available soon at the IEA’s website/YouTube channel.
Money growth (M£) in the USA
Juan Castañeda
Summary of the report (in pages 4-5):
  • The policy reaction to the Covid-19 pandemic will increase budget deficits massively in all the world’s leading countries. The deficits will to a significant extent be monetised, with heavy state borrowing from both national central banks and commercial banks.
  • The monetisation of budget deficits, combined with official support for emergency bank lending to cash-strained corporates, is leading – and will continue to lead for several months – to extremely high growth rates of the quantity of money.
  • The crisis has shown again that, under fiat monetary systems, the state can create as much as money as it wants. There is virtually no limit to money creation. The frequently alleged claim that ‘monetary policy is exhausted at low (if not zero) interest rates’ has no theoretical or empirical basis.
  • By mid- or late 2021 the pandemic should be under control, and a big bounce-back in financial markets, and in aggregate demand and output, is to be envisaged. The extremely high growth rates of money now being seen – often into the double digits at an annual percentage rate – will instigate an inflationary boom. The scale of the boom will be conditioned by the speed of money growth in the rest of 2020 and in early 2021. Money growth in the USA has reached the highest-ever levels in peacetime, suggesting that consumer inflation may move into double digits at some point in the next two or three years.
  • Central banks seem heedless of the inflation risks inherent in monetary financing of the much-enlarged government deficits. Following the so-called ‘New Keynesian Model’ consensus, their economists ignore changes in the quantity of money. Too many of these economists believe that monetary policy is defined exclusively by interest rates, with a narrow focus on the central bank policy rate, long-term interest rates and the yield curve. The quantity theory of money today provides – as it always has done – a theoretical framework which relates trends in money growth to changes in inflation and nominal GDP over the medium and long term. A condition for the return of inflation to current target levels is that the rate of money growth is reduced back towards annual rates of increase of about 6 per cent or less.

Read Full Post »

It’s not all about interest rates!

In a piece published by CityAM on 12/11/2019 (‘Interest rates aren’t central banks’ only ammunition to defend against recession‘), I criticised the view apparently shared by most policy commentators about the alleged lack of ammunition of central banks to tackle the next crisis; they claim that this is because policy rates have reached either zero or close to zero levels and therefore there is no more room for monetary expansion. As I put in the article, this is wrong:

But interest rate change is not the only policy tool available to create money. Indeed, nor is it the most effective in times of crisis. In modern economies, where monetary systems are purely based on fiat currencies, money can be created “out of thin air”. As shocking as it may sound, this means that central banks can always increase the amount of money in the economy.

Since 2008 central bank (main policy) rates had been cut down to zero or near zero territory, and for many years it was mainly by changes in the amount of money how central banks managed to stabilise spending (through unconventional policy measures or QE). The outcome in the US, the UK but also in the Eurozone (though achieved much later), has been the stabilisation of the rate of growth of broad money in these economies followed by a period of a relatively stable overall macroeconomic picture (i.e. broad money growth in the US around 4% – 5% for a long period of time).

 

Broad money growth, US

 

The fundamentals to understand how monetary policy decisions are made in modern monetary systems, particularly in times of a financial crisis, where commercial banks struggle to expand deposits, can be summarised as follows:

  • In the absence of a truly binding anchor (such a metallic standard under the gold or silver standards) central banks can always create money ‘out of thin air’, with no limit.
  • In modern monetary systems both commercial banks and central banks create money; actually the bulk of the means of payments used are created by commercial banks in the form of deposits and the extension of overdrafts (see the seminal paper on this, Money creation in the modern economy , by McLead, Radia and Thomas, 2014).
  • The announcement and later application of tighter bank regulation in the midst of the Global Financial Crisis (2009 – 2010) increased bank capital requirements by approx. 60%, thus limiting the ability of banks to give loans and create deposits (i.e. money) in an already recessive economy. In the absence of the creation of money by markets (i.e. banks), central banks had no choice but to step in and buy assets from the market (from non-financial institutions), the so-called QE operations. Otherwise, money supply would have contracted very severely, with the harm it would have inflicted on the economy (this time, central bankers were determined to avoid the mistakes they made in the Great Depression years as Ben Bernanke had famously put it back in 2002, when deposits contracted by more than 30% in four years in the USA, therefore aggravating and prolonging the recession).

I argue in the article that, for better or worse, the ‘monetary weaponry’ in modern monetary systems can never be exhausted (Venezuela today is a dramatic example of it, when the printing press is heavily exploited by the government). Under purely fiat monetary systems, we need to tie the hands of the central banks so they abide by a rule in order to maintain a moderate and stable rate of growth of money; a rule that does not result in excessive money growth during the expansion of the economy, nor in a strong decline or even a fall in money growth during recessions. My colleague from the University of Buckingham and the Institute of International Monetary Research, Professor Geoffrey Wood, explains masterly and in few minutes how to define and adopt such a monetary rule in the Eurozone in this video.

 

Juan Castañeda

PS. You can have access to the CityAM article in full at https://www.cityam.com/interest-rates-arent-central-banks-only-ammunition-to-defend-against-recession/

 

Read Full Post »

Confronting financial crises under different monetary regimes:  Spain in the Great Depression years

This is the title of the paper I have written with my friend and colleague Professor Pedro Schwartz, which is being published in May 2018 as a chapter in a book, Money, Currency and Crisis. In Search of Trust, 2000 BC to AD 2000, edited by R. J. van der Spek and Bas van Leewen (Routledge). As we put it in the first section of the chapter, “the thesis of the present essay is that the recession was much lighter in Spain than in the US, Italy, Germany or France (see Figure 1); that the causes of the contraction were domestic rather than epidemic; and that the relative shallowness of the contraction in Spain, and of the UK after abandoning gold, may have been due in some measure to similarly flexible monetary arrangements.

 

The exchange rate system does matter in coping with a major crisis, and both the 1930s and the 2000s crises are good examples of this. Spain in the 1920s and 1930s, free of exchange rate commitments, and thus with full monetary sovereignty, led the Peseta float  in response to quite dramatic changes in both domestic and international market conditions. Being a very rigid economy at the time, the depreciation of the Peseta was an effective and timely tool to cut down costs and prices. This is not to say that depreciation is panacea; it is not! If not followed by orthodox both fiscal and monetary policies, it will just lead to greater and greater inflation over time, and we have plenty of examples of this. It is useful though to compare the adjustment of the Spanish economy to the Great Depression in the 1930s to that to the Global Financial Crisis in the 2000s via ‘internal devaluation’ (i.e. cutting domestic wages and prices); the charts below are quite revealing of the effects of these two alternatives (see Figures 15 and 16) and do provide a textbook case-study on the advantages and disadvantages of each.

 

As figures 15 and 16 above show, the depreciation of the Peseta carried most of the burden of the adjustment to the 1930s crisis, while it has been domestic costs (Unit Labour Costs) in the 2000s crisis.

Over the medium to the long term, both an internal devaluation and a standard (external) devaluation achieve the same (necessary) goal: to cut down costs, prices and spending in the economy in crisis. This is something unavoidable in either policy scenario; the economy cannot continue spending as it used to before the crisis. In addition, an internal devaluation also brings greater competitiveness over the long term, given that the economy will be able to produce with lower costs than its competitors. However, the economic and political costs of this latter policy option are not negligible in the short term. This is the trade-off every economy confronts in a major crisis, (1) either to opt for a quick devaluation to cut down domestic costs and prices almost instantaneously, or (2) to cut down public and private spending (internal devaluation).

  • The external devaluation option, when the country retains its currency and its domestic monetary policy, is the most appealing option in the short term; especially by politicians, as it may be unnoticed by the public for a time. But, if not accompanied by fiscal and monetary restrictive policies, it will surely lead to inflation very soon.
  • The internal devaluation option was the only available for the Eurozone countries in the 2000s crisis, and was the right policy to pursue, however painful as indeed it was. The experience of Spain, and the other Eurozone countries in crisis from 2009 to 2014, shows again how stringent the conditions to remain in a monetary union are in times of crisis: both labour and good and services markets must be as flexible as possible to let prices go up and down whenever needed; otherwise, the adjustment will be even more painful and will take longer, and more jobs and output will be lost.

The preference for one or the other policy will depend very much on how rigid markets are to adjust to new market conditions, and the commitment of policy-makers to run orthodox monetary and fiscal policies. In the absence of committed policy-makers to adjusting costs and prices, an external devaluation will just be a gateway to rampant inflation.

 

Juan Castañeda

 

——————–

For those interested in the chapter, please find the abstract below (more in the book!):

Spain was effectively on silver from 1868 down to the II Republic in 1931. Being off the gold standard and on a depreciating silver standard from the 1890s on helped the economy adjust almost painlessly to the several economic crises it suffered during that period and resulted in a much milder recession than the rest of the world in the 1930s. This proves how relevant is the monetary regime to deal with shocks and economic crises, particularly when confronting financial crises. 

Devaluation corrects past policy mistakes at the cost of making the country poorer; but it will only hold in the longer term if it is accompanied by sound fiscal and monetary policies. During WWI a neutral Spain had accumulated a large gold reserve by selling to all belligerent countries. Pressure to move to gold was resisted but the slow depreciation of the silver anchor after WWI was accompanied by a surprisingly sound Bank of Spain monetary policy. Though the Treasury did use its power to borrow from the Bank from time to time the Board of the Bank correspondingly tightened interest rates to maintain monetary stability. This resulted in quite moderate rates of growth of the money supply that helped keep internal prices in check. In fact, the peseta behaved like a properly managed nominal currency. In the ‘twenties the rate of exchange of the peseta versus the pound sterling fell along with silver against gold, due to a persistent structural deficit in the balance of payments; and though from 1929 to 1935 the peseta fell less rapidly than silver, it did fall more than if it had been on gold.

Being on the silver standard dampened the effects of the Great Depression in Spain. Under a gold standard regime the balance of payments would have rebalanced quickly but with a large restructuring cost such as that suffered by Spain today under the ‘euro-standard’: Then as now, almost immovable structural inflexibility makes external depreciation a more politically and socially acceptable policy than harshly imposed internal devaluation.

Another positive effect of the peseta being anchored on a depreciating silver standard was to allow the Bank of Spain freely to act as lender of last resort in 1931 and thus prevent the deep banking crisis that struck other developed economies.

However one must not exaggerate the effect of a flexible monetary policy in a country like Spain in the 1930ies: Spain still was an agricultural country and she enjoyed two bumper crops in wheat in 1933 and 1935; and in any case the relative smallness of the foreign sector helped dampen the effects of what was happening in the rest of the world.

Read Full Post »

This is the title of an article written with my colleague, Tim Congdon (Institute of International Monetary Research and University of Buckingham), published in CityAM on 27/10/2017.

Our main point is that more regulation won’t make banks safer and is counterproductive. It is a sort of an instinctive reaction by politicians, policy-makers and regulators to respond to a crisis with more and tighter regulation, in an effort to tackle the ‘excesses’ in the market economy left of its own will. This is both very naive and irresponsible, as much as empirically and theoretically wrong. The recent announcement and approval of the Basell III tighter bank capital ratios is an example of it: this tougher set of regulations was announced and approved in the midst of a severe financial crisis (2008-2010), and resulted in banks shrinking their balance sheets even more; with the expected dramatic fall in money growth and nominal spending.

It is again a dire example of the running of the law of the unintended consequences of regulation; which would recommend the need to assess in advance the expected consequences of regulation, rather than quickly and desperately calling for more and tougher laws on banks and the rest of the financial system.

As we put it in the article:

Far too many people believe that “better” regulation is the answer to financial crises. But further regulation involves an expansion of the power of the state, and a loss of freedom for the financial system. Remember that Britain had no explicit official rules on bank capital until the 1980s, yet no British bank suffered a run on its deposits over the preceding century. Crucial to the success of British banking in the decades before the Northern Rock fiasco was the Bank of England’s willingness to lend to solvent banks if they were having difficulty funding their assets. Good central banking helped Britain’s commercial banks to run their businesses efficiently and profitably, and to the benefit of their customers.’

There was a time, not that far away, when regulation was not that prominent and financial markets flourished; and when a banking institution failed, that occasionally they did, there were solid policies and institutions willing to intervene in an decisively and orderly manner (the Bank of England had been an example of that, at least until the collapse of Norther rock in the recent crisis).

You will find the article in full here: http://www.cityam.com/274672/tighter-bank-regulation-wont-stop-boom-and-bust-but-damage.

Comments, even more if critical, most welcome!

Juan Castañeda

PS. We will be discussing these issues with the member of the Bank of England’ s Financial Policy Committee, Martin Taylor, in the IIMR Annual Public Lecture on the 7/10 in London: https://www.mv-pt.org/events/public-lecture-the-committee-of-public-safety-the-work-of-the-financial-policy-committee-by-m

 

 

Read Full Post »

‘How functional is the Eurozone? An index of European economic integration through the single currency’

This is the title of the paper I have just written with my good friend and colleague, Professor Pedro Schwartz (Camilo Jose Cela University in Madrid and University of Buckingham), which will be published in Economic Affairs (October issue, 2017).

We deal with a quite straight forward question: How can we measure the optimality of a currency area? When does it become more and more difficult to run a single monetary policy? If there are internal asymmetries in the currency area, how do they evolve? To answer, if only tentatively, these questions we have developed the method to calculate the index of optimality of a currency area, which we have split up in four major categories and components: (1) fiscal synchronicity, (2) public finance, (3) competitiveness and (4) monetary. Both the overall index and the above partial indices will inform us about the performance of the currency union and how internal asymmetries have increased or decreased. We have applied it to the eurozone, from 1999 to 2016. The results and calculations give us a metric to identify the building up of internal tensions in the running of the single monetary policy since the inception of the euro in 1999.

If only a chart, this is the summary of what we found in our research; in a nutshell, the adoption of the euro has not increased convergence among eurozone economies. The overall index of dispersion increased by 25% from 1999 to 2005 (see figure below),  and so asymmetries amongst member states even during an expansionary cycle. Of course, as expected, internal dispersion soared during and immediately after the outbreak of the Global Financial Crisis. This increase in dispersion in the crisis years ‘s not a symptom of the malfunction of the euro; what we should rather focus on is on the time taken for asymmetries to resume pre-crisis levels. Overall, even after 10 year since the start of the recent crisis, the optimality index still shows the Eurozone has a long way ahead to resume pre-2007 crisis levels (such as 1999 levels, when even countries joining the Eurozone were far from convergence).

 

 

This is the abstract of the paper:

‘This is a step in empirically assessing how near the Eurozone is to becoming an ‘optimal currency area’, as originally defined by Mundell (1961). For this purpose we have compiled ten indicators, organised them in four chapters, and summarised them in an overall indicator of ‘optimality’. The resulting picture is mixed, with zone optimality not increasing when circumstances were favourable but the trend towards integration returning after the 2008-2014 crisis. The suggestion is that dis-integration during the crisis, rather than an evidence of failure of the Eurozone when the going was tough, showed a self-healing mechanism at work. However our measurements and indices show that optimality is much lower than that in 1999.’

Feedback most welcome, as ever.

Juan Castañeda

 

Read Full Post »

This is the title of a research paper I have written with my colleague and leading monetarist, Professor Tim Congdon, and published by the Institute of International Monetary Research (IIMR). This is a brief summary extracted from the paper, which is fully available at http://www.mv-pt.org/research-papers:

The quantity of money matters in the design of a monetary policy regime, if that regime is to be stable or even viable on a long-term basis. The passage of events in the Eurozone since 1999 has shown, yet again, that excessive money growth leads to both immoderate asset price booms and unsustainably above-trend growth in demand and output, and that big falls in the rate of change in the quantity of money damage asset markets, undermine demand and output, and cause job losses and heavy unemployment. This is nothing new. The ECB did not sustain a consistent strategy towards money growth and banking regulation over its first decade and a half. The abandonment of the broad money reference value in 2003 was followed in short order by three years of unduly high monetary expansion and then, from late 2008, by a plunge in money growth to the lowest rates seen in European countries since the 1930s. The resulting macroeconomic turmoil was of the sort that would be expected by quantity theory- of-money analyses, including such analyses of the USA’s Great Depression as in Friedman and Schwartz’s Monetary History of the United States.

This paper argues, from the experience of the Eurozone after the introduction of the single currency in 1999, that maintaining steady growth of a broadly-defined measure of money is crucial to the achievement of stability in demand and output. The ECB did not sustain a consistent strategy towards money growth and banking regulation over its first decade and a half.

The chart below illustrates our point very well:

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

As ever, comments very welcome.

Juan Castañeda

 

Read Full Post »

Older Posts »