Selgin on deflation(s)

Professor G. Selgin (University of Georgia and Cato) has masterly studied the question of deflations and distinguished those benign deflations, associated with increasing productivity and economic growth, from those recessive deflations associated with stagnation in the economy, increasing unemployment and financial instability, which seems to be the only one mostly considered by all and sundry. As Hayek did it in the 20s and 30s last century, Selgin has studied in detailed this question and has emphasised the notable implications of distinguishing amongst these different types of deflations in the running of a sound monetary policy rule (see his excellent Less than zero. The case for a falling price level in a growing economy, fully available at the IEA website).

One of the main implications of his analysis of deflations for policy making is that price stabilisation (either the price level or the inflation rate) is not a desirable policy criterion if we are committed to achieving monetary stability in the long term: it can lead to excessive money growth in the expansions of the economy (thus, monetary disequilibrium), being a major pro-cyclical policy that will destabilise financial markets in the medium to the long term. Other, both theoretical and operational, critiques to price stability as a policy criterion can be found here. This is by far the main lesson that can be drawn for the recent financial crisis and its precedent years, and it will a be very useful one if we do not want to resume the same policy rules that have contributed to the recent crisis and the monetary and financial chaos in which we are still in.

Enjoy George Selgin’s video, which is a recent CNBC interview; it is an excellent and brief explanation on the nature and consequences of different  deflations: 
http://video.cnbc.com/gallery/?video=3000171632

Juan Castañeda

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“Central banks should do less, not more” (“Los Bancos Centrales deben hacer menos, no más”)

 ”Los Bancos Centrales deben hacer menos, no más”

Este es el acertado titular con que el periodista especializado en economía, Diego Sánchez de la Cruz, resume nuestra entrevista, que acaba de publicarse en Libre Mercado (10/3/2013). En un tiempo en que parece que todos piden al banco central que haga más, como si fuera una especie de Deus ex Machina  omnipotente capaz de sacarnos de la crisis y parálisis económica actuales, merece la pena recordar que fue precisamente el activismo y excesivo crecimiento monetario desarrollado en la última expansión económica lo que está en la base de los problemas que aún padecemos. Por eso, una vez solventada la crisis financiera (cuando quiera que ésto sea), convendría reflexionar sobre cuál es la mejor política monetaria para la nueva etapa expansiva que, en mi opinión, pasará por una reforma en profundidad de las reglas monetarias vigentes hasta 2007. Una política monetaria que sea menos activa y se centre en la estabilidad monetaria y no en el manejo de la economía, el control del ciclo (del “output gap”) ni tampoco la estabilización de los precios, menos aún si se hace persiguiendo un crecimiento (aunque sea moderado) de la inflación medida mediante el IPC.

Hablamos también de los recientes rescates bancarios, la política de préstamo (más o menos expreso)  de los bancos centrales a sus Estados, así  como de algunas alternativas al sistema actual de monopolio de emisión de moneda de curso legal controlado en última instancia por el Estado. Como siempre, vuestros comentarios serán muy bienvenidos en el blog.

Texto completo de la entrevista aquí:

http://www.libremercado.com/2013-03-10/juan-castaneda-los-bancos-centrales-deben-hacer-menos-no-mas-1276484372/

Juan Castañeda

 ——————-

(A summary in English)

“Central banks should do less, not more”

This is the headline of my recent interwiew with the economic journalist, Diego Sánchez de la Cruz, just published in Libre Mercado (10/03/2013). In a time when all and sundry ask the central bank to do more, as if it were an omnipotent “Deus ex Machina”  able to overcome the current economic and financial crisis, it is worth remembering that it was central banks’ monetary activism and excessive money creation during the last economic expansion what ultimately caused a massive distortion in financial markets and led to the current crisis. As recessions and crises have its roots in the previous expansion, we should be discussing now which is the best monetary policy to be adopted in the next expansionary phase of the cycle (see here a summary of the debate in the UK). One less active and more focused on maintaining monetary stability and not the management of the economy, the stabilisation of the cycle (the “output gap”) or price stabilisation, let alone the stabilisation of a positive inflation target as measured by CPI.

We also discussed in the interview other “policies” of the central banks, such as the recent banks’ bailouts and the more or less explicit financial assistance to the(ir) States; finally, we also talk about some alternatives to the current monetary system ultimately controlled by the State. As always, your comments are very welcome.

Full access to the interview here:

http://www.libremercado.com/2013-03-10/juan-castaneda-los-bancos-centrales-deben-hacer-menos-no-mas-1276484372/

Juan Castañeda

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Una crisis económica sorprendente (2007-2012)

La verdad es que esta profesión tiene una buena parte de vanidad y la entrada de hoy es una nueva muestra de ello. Hace ya meses, en septiembre de 2012 salió a la venta el libro que he escrito con el economista José Antonio Aguirre, titulado “Una crisis económica sorprendente (2007-2012)” (Ediciones Aosta), del que escribí un artículo en el blog sobre el contenido del libro.

José Antonio Aguirre es un economista profesional que sabe realmente de mercados financieros y de los economistas clásicos; de hecho, ha sido el editor pionero en la traducción al castellano de libros clásicos de economía de autores de referencia, como I. Fisher,  F. Hayek o K. Wicksell u otros más recientes e igualmente relevantes como James Buchanan o George Selgin. De la mano de mi director de tesis doctoral (Prof. Schwartz), tuve ocasión de leer su magnífico estudio sobre la banca central y la competencia monetaria, que acompañó a la edición en castellano del excelente libro de Vera Smith de 1936, “Fundamentos de la Banca Central y de la Libertad Bancaria“; ambos trabajos de lectura diría que obligatoria para quienes quieran entender los fundamentos del sistema de banca central actual y sus alternativas. Por ello, ha sido un verdadero placer para mi escribir este libro con quién, sin saberlo entonces, me ayudó tanto a entender un poco más sobre lo que es el dinero con su trabajos sobre economía monetaria.

Aquí podréis ver más información sobre el libro, una reseña y el índice de contenidos.

La presentación tendrá lugar el martes 5 de febrero de 2013 (19:00hrs.) en la Fundación Rafael del Pino (Madrid). Aquí encontraréis más datos prácticos sobre el acto. El profesor Pedro Schwartz hará la presentación, seguida de la intervención de los autores y de un tiempo para preguntas y comentarios del público. Por supuesto, como siempre, y lo saben bien quienes me conocen, las preguntas serán muy bienvenidas, especialmente si son críticas.

En fin, me permito invitarte a venir y quedo muy agradecido de antemano.

Juan Castañeda

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Is nominal income targeting really on the table Mr Carney?

In a recent speech at Toronto, the next Governor of the Bank of England, Mr. Carney, has recently suggested (or better, implied) that nominal income targeting could be a better alternative monetary strategy to flexible inflation targeting. This is not trivial at all, and has not received enough attention in the media yet (amongst those who did, see Lars Christensen´s entry to his very interesting blog: “The Market Monetarist” from which I knew about it).

Mr Carney may have wisely identified one of the main flaws of  past monetary policy decisions and a major cause of the financial distress suffered in most developed economies since 2007/08: by targeting inflation and, even worse, CPI inflation, most central banks achieved price stability yes (thus defined), but at the same time credit and liquidity expanded too much and for too long worldwide. During the years of the expansion of world output prior to 2007 (during the so-called “Great Moderation” years), mainly due to significant technological progress and the huge development and growth of India and China´s exports of manufactured goods in international markets, a growing world supply of consumption goods and services led to quite stable and moderate (consumption) prices. However, at the same time (in particular, since early 2000s years), any measure of broad money growth showed an exceptional increase in liquidity, which distorted agents´s investment decisions and resources allocation. We now know how it badly ended in huge financial instability, massive output losses and employment cuts and even economic depression in some peripheral EMU countries. In a nutshell, as leading economists of the 20s clearly identified and stated (F.A. Hayek amongst them, or George Selgin in our days), in a growing economy, the conduct of a price stability rule does not guarantee monetary stability, nor financial stability. Contrary to what is commonly thought, it is not a necessary condition I am afraid (see more details here).

Unlike the standard “inflation targeting” strategy, the one adopted by the Bank of England (and many others) since 1998, a nominal income rule does not set an inflation target alone but a nominal income target. By doing so, the central bank would adopt the joint evolution of prices and real output as the policy target. Under this rule, if the economy is growing, an increasing supply of real output may be offset by decreasing inflation or even mild (benign) deflation, thus leading to a more modest nominal income measure, and thus less money growth. In my view, if adopted as a policy rule, this alternative monetary policy would have resulted in more modest and stable money growth (thus more money stability) and it may have reduced the likelihood of the massive dislocation of financial markets occurred in recent years. The theoretical basis of this rule can be seen in the work I published in 2005 for the Journal of the Institute of Economic Affairs, as well as its application in a more recent academic work I wrote with professor G. Wood. As stated in both works, a nominal income targeting rule is more compatible with monetary stability, a true necessary condition to achieve long run economic growth as well as financial stability.

There is a now a much clearer support for this type of rules. The reason is quite obvious: as real GDP is stagnated if not decreasing and CPI inflation is still moderate (roughly around 2%-3%), the conduction of a nominal income rule which targets the rate of growth of real GDP in the medium to the long run would produce higher rates of growth of money, being thus even more expansionary. This might be the reason why it is becoming a quite popular rule in our days. However, this is not all. In order to be a stabilising (sound and beneficial) rule in the medium to the long run, it should be fully symmetrical; so that in a context of a new phase of economic growth and disinflation (or mild deflation) liquidity growth becomes much more moderate than in the years prior to 2007. This will be the true test to this rule, if ever applied by central banks in the coming years.

Let´s see in the coming months if a very much needed debate on monetary policy rules is finally open in the UK or elsewhere. At least a major figure amongst central bankers has suggested it. Well done and good luck Mr Carney!

Juan Castañeda

PS. I want to acknowledge and thank Lars Christensen for his excellent blog on monetary economics (The Market Monetarist), from which I learned about Mr Carney´s speech.

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And then we all became economists …

One of the few positive consequences of the recent financial crisis is that people do know now much more about how markets work, on the scope and limits of Government intervention and, even more important, on the unintended consequences of ill-designed policies and bad regulation. We might not be fully aware of it now, but better informed people will be an essential requisite to better monitor and control discretionary and inflationary policies in the future. Those who have a degree in Economics will be familiar with what economists usually call  ”rational behaviour” or “rational agents”, who are able to escape from another very important concept, “money illusion”. Let me explain then very briefly.

Being rational in economics means that we make decisions by exploiting all the information and resources at our disposal in order to get a particular outcome (whichever the final goal is: increasing the value of a portfolio or that of a charity). This rational assumption does not necessarily imply that people cannot err; of course they can, but then they will learn by their own experience and incorporate past failures in order to improve how to make their expectations in the future. So the key point is that they cannot be cheated systematically! One example of this is the ability of people to react to anticipated inflation; after suffering substantial losses in the past, as a consequence of recurrent inflationary policies, people have learned that (1) real variables is what really matters in making economic decisions and that (2) printing money is not tantamount to prosperity or economic growth (quite the contrary!). In consequence, in a nutshell, in the face of excessive fiscal spending and money growth, inflation will be expected; so people, instead of keeping on increasing their spending more and more, will be saving part of their income in deposits and other financial assets adjusted to inflation in order to maintain their purchasing power along the time. By doing so they will not have “money illusion” and will act rationally.

People may have finally seen that the expansionary monetary policies conducted before 2007 led to inflation and provoked market distortions and major financial instability. Let´s see if we have learned this important and painful lesson of the recent crisis, so we can counteract these policies should they persist in the near future.

Finally, find here a very brief and funny (fiction) movie that depicts a conversation amongst traditional Spanish housewives (in Andalusia), who wisely discuss on the current policies to overcome the crisis in a typical and beautiful southern spanish “patio”. I wish most economic ministers and Governments´economic advisers had their knowledge and vivid conversation! Enjoy it:

- Hablando en Plata (Directed by Mikel Gil, “Producciones Varadas”):

Juan Castañeda

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Quantitative Easing or the reinvention of the wheel

Much has been said about the QE operations conducted in the US and elsewhere in the recent financial crisis. Some have claimed they constitute a true revolution in central banking; some have even gone further to suggest that it is the beginning of a new monetary policy. And, also quite many still claim that these extraordinary monetary policy measures should not be applied as they are supposed to be highly inflationary by their own nature.

Just a very quick look at the modern monetary history in Europe and in the US will reveal how wrong those views can be. On the one hand, as tested quite many times in our economic history, yes, too loose monetary policies (via QE operations or other else) will result in inflation, but only if (broad) money grows much faster than real income. So, how inflationary QE will be in the coming years cannot be assessed without making a proper monetarist analysis. Monetary expansion will have other effects, true (in part, already addressed here). On the other hand, even though under a different name, with the current QE operations we are just “inventing the wheel” or, following the Spanish saying, “discovering the Mediterranean sea”.

As quoted from Geoffrey Wood’s “The lender of last resort reconsidered” (A paper prepared for a conference in honour of Anna J Schwartz. Washington, 14-15 April 2000), in relation to the 1825 panic affecting the british banks:

“There had been a substantial external drain of gold, and there was a shortage of currency.  A panic developed, and there were runs on banks.  The type of bills the Bank would normally discount soon ran out and the panic continued.  If a wave of bank failures were to be prevented, the banks would have had to borrow on the security of other types of assets. Of that change of policy Jeremiah Harman, a Director of the Bank, spoke as follows when giving evidence before a Parliamentary Committee in 1832.  The Bank had lent money “… by every possible means and in modes we had never adopted before; we took in stock on security, we purchased Exchequer bills, we made advances in Exchequer bills, we not only discounted outright but we made advances on the deposit of bills of exchange to an immense amount, in short by every means consistent with the safety of the Bank, and we were not on some occasions over nice”. Published in the Journal of Financial Services Research, 2000, vol. 18, issue 2, pages 203-227. See:  
http://link.springer.com/article/10.1023/A%3A1026542821454
.

So the Bank of England, already in the early 19th c., did conduct a truly active monetary policy to prevent the collapse of the banking system in Britain “by every possible means”; which included the purchase of stocks, public bonds, the discount of paper, … . And even most interesting,  Professor Wood (Cass Business School and University of Buckingham) provided in his work (written in 2000!) an excellent description of several successful application of the lender of last resort role of central banks that did prevent the collapse of the banking system without provoking (the supposed) hyperinflation. His work could have been taken as an excellent guide to make policy decisions from 2008 on.

The study of monetary history will do no harm to all of us at all, either academics or policy-makers. Quite the contrary!!!

Juan Castañeda

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Keynes and Hayek: A never ending controversy in funny videos (Econstories.tv)

Keynes and Hayek: A never ending controversy

A classic: what would have J. M. Keynes and F. A. Hayek said in the context of this major financial crisis were they alive? What would these “giants” of Economics suggest to tackle the problems arisen in the recent crisis?

Hayek

Well, we know quite well what Hayek would have probably suggested. Firstly, in relation to the diagnosis of the crisis, his theoretical works on the boom and bust crises fit very well with the current crisis. Moreover, his (Austrian) interpretation of the business cycles is very well-established in his works, mostly written in the 20s and 30s, and they have indeed received much more attention recently. So I do firmly think that he would claim some credit for the Austrian theory of the business cycle. As to his policy measures to overcome the crisis, I am afraid that he would probably suggest that the painful adjustment of the economy (including the liquidation of the so-called mal-investments, those associated with excessive money growth in the expansionary years) would have to take place, one way or another. And he would also possibly claim, as he did in his excellent works on money, central banks and the monetary system, that we should finally reform the nature of the monetary system with the introduction of more competence in the money market; which would imply the abolition of the legal tender clause of the national money(ies). This is exactly what he proposed in his Institute of Economic Affairs excellent “Denationalisation of money” in 1976.

Keynes

In relation to Keynes, we cannot be so positive about what he would have said. We know how pragmatic (and “case sensitive”) and even volatile Keynes could be, so we cannot really predict the policy solutions he would have proposed. This is exactly what Hayek claimed on the academic relation they maintained in the 30s. By the time Hayek was able to reply and contest a Keynes’ book or article, the latter had already launched another work with a different approach and even with a quite different perspective or theory. This was viewed by Hayek as a lack of consistency, something Hayek was not accustomed to and very much unusual for the very systematic Austrian theorist. Anyhow, if it were the Keynes of the General Theory, he would indeed ask the State to take firm steps in the running of the economy by the conduction of the aggregate (effective) demand. In essence, it would imply both (1) lowering nominal interest rates to the minimum and (2) then managing directly aggregate investment.

Another interpretation: some videos proposed

There is an excellent (and much funnier and entertaining) interpretation of their theories, and their application/adaptation to the current scenario, masterly made by John Papola and Russ Roberts in their very interesting and valuable “Econstories.tv” ‘s project. You will find below  several videos on the works and theories of these two economists, as well as interviews with excellent scholars on the works of this two excellent economists (see the interviews with Professor Lawrence White and Lord Robert Skidelsky).

- Video 1: “Fear the boom and bust”, at: 
http://econstories.tv/2010/06/22/fear-the-boom-and-bust/

- Video 2: “Fight of the century”, at: 
http://econstories.tv/2011/04/28/fight-of-the-century-music-video/

Enjoy them.

Juan Castañeda

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España, de nuevo una sátira taurina

(Artículo publicado originalmente el 1 de octubre de 2012 en el diario en internet oroyfinanzas.com)

La economía española y la sátira taurina

 

El pasado mes de julio el prestigioso semanario The Economist  abrió a toda página con la imagen de un toro ensangrentado y prácticamente abatido, lo que simbolizaba un animal herido de muerte. Por si no fuera evidente la metáfora con España, encabezaba el diario un “Spain” del que intencionadamente se había desprendido su “S” inicial, dejando así claramente y en evidencia la pena y el sufrimiento por los que atravesaba el viejo país de la piel de toro. Y para ya no dejar duda alguna, el toro estaba marcado por la divisa del euro … .

 

Aunque en la actualidad  muchos se empeñen en negar la identificación  de este animal con las culturas mediterráneas, esa íntima relación ha estado bien presente desde antiguo. Por no remontarnos muy atrás, como dijo Ortega y Gasset en 1883, “Afirmo de la manera más taxativa que no puede comprender bien la Historia de España, desde 1650 hasta hoy, quien no se haya cimentado con rigorosa construcción la historia de las corridas de toros en el sentido estricto del término, no de la fiesta de toros que, más o menos vagamente, ha existido en la Península desde hace tres milenios, sino lo que nosotros actualmente llamamos con ese nombre.” La fiesta ha vivido modificaciones en sus tradiciones y sus protagonistas, pero siempre se le ha considerado símbolo y reflejo del momento histórico concreto. Por ello, la imagen mencionada del toro malherido ofrecida por The Economist no es nueva; nos recordó a una de las caricaturas satíricas que mejor representa la debacle española de finales del siglo XIX, en pleno gobierno de Sagasta, publicada en la revista satírico-política La Broma, el 31 de agosto de 1882.

Es “El novillo de la mojiganga”. Describe a un pobre animal objeto de burla y herido por doquier por las clases pudientes y dirigentes de la época. En ella se ve, ante la impotencia del alguacilillo que representa la autoridad, cómo el animal (símbolo de la pobre España), cubierto  de rejones, estoques de matar y banderillas, es incapaz de embestir y humillado no puede  tolerar una herida más; ya sea bajo la forma de un nuevo impuesto, un nuevo privilegio o una nueva e injusta legislación. La imagen de esta caricatura no deja lugar a la duda y, por desgracia, resulta tan pertinente y expresiva de la dura realidad de hoy como ya lo era entonces.

¿Y qué era eso de la “mojiganga”? Se trataba de una variante del toreo cómico que procede del siglo XVIII y se mantuvo hasta casi fines del XIX. Tiene sus raíces en el teatro, ya que es similar a los “entremeses” que se hacían en el teatro clásico como divertimento y descanso en los espectáculos de obras dramáticas y comedias. En espectáculos taurinos de menor importancia se soltaba el “novillo de la mojiganga” al ruedo mientras se desarrollaban escenas de parodias puramente mímicas con personajes disfrazados. Los temas eran variados, siempre de actualidad, muy reconocibles por el público; y el animal se convertía en protagonista de la escena entre risas y miedos, pues acometía y embestía a los personajes. Los actores solían ser toreros humildes que no eran contratados en corridas serias ya por su juventud o su madurez. Era un espectáculo grotesco y pobre en vestimentas y atrezos que fue perdiendo importancia y a fines del XIX ya no se practicaba.

La sátira taurina de nuevo de actualidad

Pues bien, parece que vamos a tener que tirar de nuestros clásicos taurinos y utilizar las mojigangas para denunciar a la clase que dirige el país en estos tiempos, por la sangría que están infringiendo al pobre animal, a la malherida España.  Les sugerimos que pongan ustedes mismos nombre a los protagonistas de esta triste parodia nacional. El resultado está a la vista de todos: la población desesperada, empobrecida y, lo que es peor, sin esperanza, cual pobre novillo sometido a los “bajonazos” de una clase dirigente que no está a la altura. Y ante este cuadro tan desesperante, ¿qué hacen las autoridades varias que nos gobiernan? Están en el mejor de los casos en el callejón, viendo los toros desde la barrera, como el alguacilillo de la caricatura de La Broma.

Juan Castañeda

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How money is created?

A conversation on money, central banks (and much more)

GoldMoney has just published a very interesting video on money and the current Eurozone crisis. In the video, James Turk interviews Professor Pedro Schwartz (San Pablo University, Madrid) on how central banks create money in our days and on the risks of the current expansionary monetary measures announced and developed by two major central banks, the ECB and the Federal Reserve of the US. As you will see, Professor Schwartz masterly explains how money is created “out of the blue” and why he thinks the ECB is actually disregarding its own Statutes, that clearly establish the prohibition of lending to any national government. How is the ECB doing so? Very easy; by purchasing public bonds of the States in crisis indirectly, in the secondary markets, and by accepting those bonds as valid and unlimited collateral in the conduction of the standard open market operations. Doing so the ECB is actually loosing its independence from political bodies and governments, and it is expanding its own remit; which was just to preserve price stability in the Eurozone, and not injecting money to foster GDP growth in the short run or to finance the State(s). Professor Schwartz also talks about the risks of inflation in the medium to the long term coming from the current (massive) injections of liquidity of central banks in the money markets.

In sum it is a very clear and interesting video that I do strongly recommend not only to any student of Economics, but also to anyone interested in how money is created in our days.

You will find below the summary of the conversation as extracted by GoldMoney.

Juan Castañeda

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“GoldMoney’s James Turk interviews Prof. Pedro Schwartz who is the president of the Economic and Social Council of Madrid. They talk about bank regulation, the creation of money out of thin air and the beauty of the free market system.

They discuss how banks have expanded despite of government regulation which Schwartz in large attributes to the granted privilege of fractional reserve lending. Using this procedure a bank can create loans above the actual amount of deposits at hand and therefore create new money. This also leads to fragility in the banking system and to boom and bust cycles. Schwartz argues for a leaner and more effective regulation of financial markets as the current regulation has not worked in regards to the financial crisis.

They talk about the “tennis” between the Federal Reserve and the European Central Bank when it comes to the creating money out of thin air. Schwartz states that the ECB is disregarding the rules that were aimed to guard it from being influenced by political pressure. Despite the opposition of the German Bundesbank they are buying government bonds. This is equal to digital money printing and Schwartz scents that it is not being done for monetary policy, but for the stimulation of the economy which goes beyond the original remit of the bank.

However despite the injections of new liquidity by the ECB Europe is still in recession, because interbank lending has dried up. That means that banks are parking much of the liquidity back at the ECB. The big question will be what will happen to inflation once the economy starts to pick up again and those funds find their way into the real economy. Schwartz also questions whether it is a productive business when banks can make a profit by borrowing money from the ECB at 1% interest and then turning around to buy government bond which yield 5% or 6%.

A serious inflationary disaster will only be prevented if governments will succeed in reducing their deficits and stop selling bonds. Schwartz states that cutting government spending is the only viable solution to the problem. To accomplish this there has to be a change in social mentality so that people recognise that nothing is free and that the government sector has to shrink. In the end the market is the most efficient mechanism of allocating resources according to the wants and needs of people.

This video was recorded on 14 September 2012 in Madrid.“

————————————————————————————

(Summary from: 
http://www.goldmoney.com/video/pedro-schwartz-on-the-creation-of-money-out-of-thin-air.html
)

 

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Una conversación sobre el patrón oro

(Artículo publicado originalmente en el diario OroyFinanzas, el 17 de Septiembre de 2012

El patrón oro, también una cuestión de poder y hegemonía

Es evidente que hay una relación entre el buen o mal gobierno de las monedas fiduciarias y el precio del oro. Cuando la gente estima que las monedas nacionales se van a depreciar, como resultado de lo que consideran políticas monetarias y fiscales demasiado expansivas, insostenibles a medio y largo plazo, aumenta la demanda de oro y se dispara su precio claro. Así ocurrió durante las crisis del dólar americano durante los años 70 del siglo pasado y ha vuelto a ocurrir desde mediados de los años 2000; lo que se ha constatado con más intensidad tras el estallido de la crisis financiera en los años 2007 y 2008. Es de todos bien conocida esta propiedad del oro como valor refugio del poder adquisitivo de los ahorradores, que ha sido “testada” y funcionado realmente bien a lo largo de muchos años (siglos).

Fuente imagen: Wikipedia commons

Otra cosa bien distinta es defender una vuelta al patrón oro, pero que muy distinta. Supone dar unos cuantos pasos más allá para cambiar no sólo el sistema monetario tal y como lo conocemos, sino también las reglas de juego de la sociedad en una economía de mercado. Es este precisamente el núcleo de la conversación que mantuve sobre este tema con Luís Iglesias en su programa “Conversaciones en libertad”. Hablamos allí de las condiciones necesarias para poder mantener un sistema de patrón oro, de sus consecuencias económicas y sociales, de cómo fijar o bien dejar libre el precio del oro, así de cómo se conduciría la política monetaria bajo ese régimen de emisión de moneda. Como ven, no es poco.

El oro y la hegemonía mundial

En otros trabajos me he centrado en las implicaciones técnicas de esta cuestión. Ciertamente son muy relevantes pero me atrevo a decir que de segundo orden comparadas con las consecuencias políticas que acarrearía esta decisión; tanto en lo referente a los cambios

(1) de modelo social y económico que traerían aparejados como (2) a los que resultarían por la disputa de la hegemonía económica mundial. Y es a estas últimas a las que me referiré, si quiera brevemente, a continuación.

Los países que a lo largo de la historia reciente han impulsado un sistema de patrón oro como norma de regulación de la oferta de dinero a escala internacional han sido siempre, y no por causalidad, los países más prósperos y poderosos económica y políticamente. Así lo fue la Inglaterra del siglo XIX (hasta la “Gran Guerra”) y así lo fue EEUU tras la Segunda Guerra Mundial (al menos entre los países democráticos y las economías de mercado). Cierto es que los sistemas de patrón oro liderados por ambos países distan mucho de ser iguales; pero al menos sí compartían la existencia de un anclaje final de sus monedas nacionales en el oro a una paridad o precio fijo. A ambos países les convino en cada momento histórico la estabilidad del sistema monetario, lo que les permitió expandir sus operaciones comerciales y financieras por todo el mundo. Y es que no descubro el Mediterráneo cuando afirmo que una moneda estable es un requisito esencial para la prosperidad comercial y económica.

¿Quién lideraría el cambio a un patrón oro ahora?

EEUU sería el primer candidato; es la superpotencia política y militar del mundo, así como aún la principal economía mundial. Además, es el principal poseedor de reservas oficiales en oro (alrededor del 25% del total mundial). A pesar de todo ello, no creo que de verdad apueste por volver al patrón oro. La razón es sencilla; ha dejado de ser desde hace décadas la economía más productiva del mundo. Tiene una balanza comercial muy, muy deficitaria desde los años 70, que ha de financiar año a año con entradas de ahorro exterior en forma de préstamos. Hasta ahora, el hecho de emitir su deuda en la aún principal moneda de reserva internacional le permite financiarse más fácilmente y sin duda a un bajo coste.

De adoptar el bajo el patrón oro clásico, gobernado por el Estado, ya no sería así. Al quedar fijado el tipo de cambio del dólar con el oro, ante el recurrente déficit comercial americano, la Reserva Federal de EEUU habría de utilizar el oro de sus reservas para mantener la cotización del dólar; ello conllevará salidas netas y masivas de oro a los países con quienes mantienen ese déficit comercial (China, países del sudeste asiático y algunos países europeos). En pocos años, la Reserva Federal agotaría sus reservas de oro y la potencia económica encargada del “manejo” del patrón oro habría de suspender la relación con el oro y devaluar su moneda. En definitiva, en muy poco tiempo la dinámica de funcionamiento del patrón oro revelaría los enormes desequilibrios de países como EEUU, ya que pronto impondría costes y límite al insostenible exceso de gasto que la economía americana, tanto de agentes privados como del Estado; exceso de gasto que aún puede permitirse precisamente porque los actuales patrones monetarios, puramente fiduciarios, permiten un manejo más “flexible” de la moneda y así esquivar (que no evitar) por un tiempo el ajuste del gasto que más tarde o más temprano habrá de llegar.

Juan Castañeda

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Nota: Puede accederse directamente al audio de la conversación en la que se basa este artículo aquí:

http://educacionparalalibertad.com/2012/09/15/hay-un-futuro-monetario-para-el-oro/

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